Abstract
Introduction
A year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US, one of the leading Polish opinion research centers 1 published its report on the threat of war as perceived by Polish society. The biggest number of respondents (37 per cent) saw the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the major threat to international peace at that time. 2 Terrorism ranked second with 31 per cent believing it was the greatest threat of all. At the same time, less than half of respondents (39 per cent)
held that international conflicts could pose a direct threat to Polish national security. 1950. But generally it was perceived as another step on the peaceful path to consolidation of the European Community. The latter is also to be understood in terms of structural changes fundamentally transforming the international environment of Poland.
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As early as 1990, the security policy and defensive doctrine of Poland were formulated so as to develop close cooperation with the FRG, including the military sphere. 17 But as much as it was assumed that the western flank was secure, the problem looked different on the eastern 'front'. The Soviet Union finally dissolved in 1991, amid the chaos of domestic tensions. A new regional power, the successor of the USSR, remained a major concern not only for
Polish leaders but for all in the Atlantic community. 18 The 26 In addition, the evolution of an alliance, continuing weakness of the EU in the field of security and defense, and emerging threats from international terrorism or 'rogue regimes' such as Iran prevailed as major factors in the thinking that was behind closer cooperation with the US and NATO.
It should also be noted that the state of the Polish army and consequently its defense doctrine was hard hit by political and economic realities of the early 1990s. influenced the decision about the antimissile defense system to be placed in Poland. Since elements of that system, namely Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs), were supposed to be integrated into Polish missile forces, it was hoped that, apart from boosting up defense capabilities, they would also be a major factor in the modernization of missile forces.
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Disposition: the threat from the East and the inherent weakness
National identity is an elusive concept that not only defies clean definition but is also difficult to apply to particular cases. Certainly historical experience will greatly influence a nation's underlying values/belief systems and perceptions. Consequently its political institutions and philosophical outlook will vary from those of its neighbors or other, even more distant nations. Additionally, when analyzing the dispositional dimension, the influence of cultural factors on a state's decisions concerning foreign policy should not be disregarded.
As mentioned earlier, Poland has had a particularly difficult experience with statehood. Once one of the most powerful kingdoms in the whole of Europe, she later lost her independence for 123 years only to be reborn as a troublesome state after World War I and finally, crashed by two titans, to suffer greatly during World War II. The shape as well as status of the state and its political system after 1945 were neither determined by the Poles, nor were they ever accepted by the majority of those who tried to redefine their lives in communist Poland.
Therefore much of the modern history of Poland has been dominated by the unquenchable thirst for true independence against all possible odds. This particular theme -fighting for freedom, paying the highest possible price for it and finally winning it -has deeply engraved the Polish soul, which is manifested by the cultural richness of the country as well as recurring motives in its foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Turning to Russia, few would deny its religious base. Communism might have attempted to eradicate orthodoxy to create a homo sovieticus, but after 1991 the role of religion and consequently the Orthodox Church has increased greatly. 48 The thing is that from Warsaw's perspective, Russian religious authorities are seen very much as chauvinistic, or to be more precise given the difficult history of Polish-Russian relations, anti-Polish. As mentioned before, the end of World War II marked a decisive change for Eastern and Central Europe.
The Soviet type of communism exported to Poland was marked by secularism. In that respect, given the history of Polish statehood and the role religion played, it rendered communist authorities not only anti-Polish but also anti-Catholic. 55 Since at least some components of Missile Defense Systems (MDS) can also be used as offensive weapons, it seems that the world continues this 'vicious cycle' of militarization 56 , whereby the seeming cure reinforces the disease.
Secondly, from an international level point of view analysis, Polish participation in the US
project was supposed to strengthen the strategic alliance forged between the two countries. with Poland, meant to create some sort of mechanism for diminishing threats from the East by the consolidation of the sense of security and stability in the region. 64 After some initial 'hiccups', the group revitalized in 1998 and has been an important element in the regional 'security environment' by virtue of its scope of cooperation ranging from culture, through economy to security. 65 In this respect, recent years have seen intensification in the areas of the fight against terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration, as well as energy security.
Polish defense complex by integrating elements of the missile defense system (Ground Based Interceptors) with Polish air defense forces. This intention has been contested by many, among experts and society alike. Most often arguments used against AMD (Anti-Missile Defense system) include exposure to Russian offensive posture, reinstatement of a Cold Warlike armaments race, militarization of US foreign policy and therefore marginalization of 'medium' and small states, wakening of military ties between the US and some European members of NATO, asymmetry between Poland and the US, which hinders potential benefits on Polish side, finally reinforcing a negative image of Poland in some of the European members of NATO as an American 'client'. 66 It has also been raised that from a purely military point of view, the installation of components of American AMD intensifies security threats to the country. The very components may potentially become the target of a physical attack by a hostile state, and may trigger intelligence activity, or cyber attacks, finally becoming an aim for transnational organized crime organizations or terrorists.
There is also a relevant element of party politics involved. The last parliamentary elections in Poland were held in 2007. 67 It has to be admitted that in their official programs, political parties did not focus on the issue of AMD. The leading party, Civic Platform, which won the elections of 2007, mentioned this issue only once in its platform. 68 Likewise, in his exposé, Prime Minister Donald Tusk referred to the antiballistic shield only once, and he did so only in the context of NATO. 69 The major competitor, Law and Justice, also did not emphasize the issue in its program, similarly referring to it only once, underlining the role of the missile defense system in forging a strategic partnership with the US. 70 The main coalition partner of the Civic Party, the Polish People's Party, did not even mention the issue in its platform. 
Conclusion
In May 2011 Romanian President Traian Basescu announced that the elements of a modified antimissile defense system will be stationed in Romania at a military base in Devesel. 77 Bulgaria has also expressed its interest in hosting elements of the US/NATO missile defense system should Turkey refuse to do so. 78 As these two examples clearly show, the presence of any elements of the designed AMD, be it US or NATO, are seen in Central 36 In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the European Union agreed on a set of reference criteria for prospective members. They include: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union. See more at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.ht m 37 Expose ministra spraw zagranicznych Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego w Sejmie -26 kwietnia 1990 r. at: http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1133%3Aexpose-I hereby declare that this paper has not been published elsewhere and that it has not been submitted simultaneously for publication elsewhere.
16.09.2011, Hong Kong
Krzysztof Sliwinski
